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Abstract: As many as two-thirds of newly-released inmates will be arrested for a new offense
within three years. This study evaluates the impact of job assistance on recidivism rates among
ex-offenders. The job assistance program, run though the private company America Works, uses
a network of employers to place clients. Ex-offenders were randomly assigned to intensive job
assistance (treatment group) or the standard program (control group). The intensive program is
meant to improve average work readiness for ex-offenders. It reduces the likelihood of
subsequent arrest among non-violent ex-offenders, but has little effect on violent ex-offenders.
The re-arrest rate for non-violent ex-offenders in the treatment group was 19 percentage points
lower than those in the control group. The re-arrest rate for violent ex-offenders in the treatment
group was indistinguishable from those in the control group. We estimate benefits from intensive
job assistance from averted crimes and find that they outweigh the $5,000 up-front cost for nonviolent ex-offenders.
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I.

Introduction
Approximately 650,000 people are released from federal and state jails and prisons in the

U.S. annually.2 Ex-offenders face daunting challenges in returning to society. Upon release, they
are likely to struggle with substance abuse, lack of adequate education and job skills, limited
housing options, and mental health issues.3
A great deal of taxpayer money has been spent on job assistance programs for this group.
The U.S. has a long history of providing federal funding for community employment programs
for ex-offenders, generally involving some combination of job-readiness (résumé writing,
interview techniques, and the like), job-training (teaching skills related to specific jobs), and jobplacement services (Visher et al. 2005). Although the direct benefits that come from such
programs accrue to ex-offenders and are therefore private in nature, such programs also create
social returns by lowering an individual’s likelihood of recidivism (Drake et al. 2009; Bushway
and Apel 2012; Cook et al, 2015). Having a legitimate job reduces the likelihood of recidivism
for ex-offenders (Sampson and Laub 1997; Harer 1994).
Recidivism rates are extremely high; roughly two-thirds of ex-offenders are arrested for a
new offense within three years of their release (Beck and Shipley 1989; Langan and Levin
2002).4 As noted in Cook et al. (2015), this is particularly true of violent offenders who face
more difficult job placement experiences. Violent offenders in particular may be of significant
concern to employers due to the perception that these individuals are more likely to be violent in
general, potentially causing problems with other employees, customers and liability. If jobassistance programs reduce subsequent criminal activity as well as the chance that ex-offenders
will be rearrested, then the social returns will be large. In the U.S., more than 23 million criminal
offenses were committed in 2007, resulting in approximately $15 billion in economic losses to
victims and $179 billion in government expenditures on police, judicial, and legal activities, as
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See http://www.justice.gov/archive/fbci/progmenu_reentry.html (accessed July 12, 2019). Holzer et al. (2003) note
that more than 600,000 offenders are released, while Raphael (2010) notes that 725,000 inmates were released from
either state or federal facilities. In 2011, more than 688,000 were released (Carson and Sabol, 2012).
3
See http://www.nij.gov/topics/corrections/reentry/Pages/welcome.aspx (accessed July 12, 2019).
4
This statistic comes from a Bureau of Justice Statistics (BJS) study on recidivism from prisoners released in 1994
from 15 states. A different research report found that the three-year recidivism rate was 45 percent for inmates
released in 1999 and 43 percent for those freed in 2004 (Pew Center on the States 2011). A newer study on the
recidivism rates of state prisoners released in 2005 revealed 68 percent were arrested within three years. See
https://www.bjs.gov/index.cfm?ty=pbdetail&iid=6266 (accessed July 12, 2019).
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well as corrections (U.S. Department of Justice 2004, 2007, 2008). As McCollister et al. (2010)
show, even relatively small crimes – like vandalism and larceny/theft – entail social costs of
several thousand dollars, while major crimes – rape/sexual assault and murder – impose
extremely high costs on society.
With respect to finding employment, ex-offenders face many challenges because of
supply-side factors as well as demand-side factors.5 One important supply-side factor is the low
level of education, training, and job experience possessed by many ex-offenders. Researchers
have found that 40-70 percent of ex-offenders are high school dropouts (Harlow 2003; Travis et
al. 2001; Freeman 1992). Harlow (2003) also found that 21-38 percent were unemployed when
initially incarcerated. Ex-offenders also face important demand-side barriers; most employers are
very reluctant to hire individuals with criminal records (Holzer et al. 2003). Some jobs or
occupations are legally closed to those with felony convictions (Hahn 1991), while other jobs
require significant levels of trustworthiness that ex-offenders are unlikely to have (Holzer et al.
2003). Many companies are also averse to employing ex-offenders because of the legal risk from
negligent hiring (Glynn 1988; Bushway 1996; Connerley et al. 2001).
Widespread use of criminal background checks increases the difficulty for ex-offenders
to find employment. The National Task Force on the Commercial Sale of Criminal Justice
Information notes an “explosion” in criminal background checks since September 11, 2001, with
millions of additional criminal record checks routinely conducted.6 Approximately two-thirds of
employers conduct criminal background checks on all job candidates (Society for Human
Resource Management 2012). Roughly half conduct such checks to reduce liability for negligent
hiring and to ensure a safe work environment. Non-violent felonies, in addition to violent crimes,
are very influential in decisions not to extend job offers. Recent experimental work finds that
employers that asked about criminal records were 63% more likely to call applicants with no
criminal record (Agan and Starr, 2018). Interestingly, callback rates do not vary much by nonviolent crime type or race (Agan and Starr, 2017). Public sentiment towards background checks
has waned in recent years coinciding with government-imposed “ban the box” policies, which
5

Holzer et al. (2003) note that supply-side factors include limited education, cognitive skills, and work experience
as well as substance abuse and other physical/mental health problems. Many ex-offenders also face racial
discrimination.
6
See http://www.search.org/files/pdf/ReportofNTFCBA.pdf (accessed July 12, 2019) and
https://web.archive.org/web/20190123214800/http://www.search.org/files/pdf/RNTFCSCJRI.pdf (accessed July 12,
2019).
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prevent employers from asking about a job applicant’s criminal record until late in the hiring
process. Recent work shows negative effects of such policies on labor market outcomes.7 As a
consequence, overcoming initial barriers to employment remains critical for those with criminal
backgrounds. Even if ban the box policies are effective at improving employment of exoffenders, only 13 states and 18 cities extend such policies to private employment (Avery, 2019).
To the extent that job assistance programs can overcome inherent barriers that exoffenders face obtaining employment, such programs could play a role in reducing criminal
recidivism. This study provides results from an experimental evaluation of an intensive job
assistance program aimed at improving job readiness and placements. The experiment involved
259 ex-offenders in New York. Randomization enrolled approximately half of enrollees to the
intensive job assistance program while the remainder were enrolled in a standard program
(offering less intensive job-readiness skills and self-directed job search). Job assistance sessions
were administered on a rolling basis between June 2009 and December 2010. Of the initial 259
participants, 219 were linked to administrative arrest records obtained through July 2012,
meaning our study follows participants for 18 to 36 months after the randomized intervention.
The intensive program was administered by America Works, a New York-based private
employment company with operations in seven states and the District of Columbia. The firm has
more than 30 years of experience providing job assistance programs to groups that typically face
significant barriers in the labor market. The program consists of intensive, short-term jobreadiness training, job placement, re-placement in cases where the initial placement does not last,
and regular follow-up and support for six months to ensure successful employment. 8
Several features distinguish the America Works job assistance program from other
employment programs. As with many of the chronically unemployed, overwhelming numbers of
ex-offenders lack work experience, have little education, and do not know how to look for a job.
The job assistance program is short-term nature (one to two weeks) with a “tough-love”
approach. It stresses interpersonal communication: listening to coworkers and supervisors,
following instructions, and being honest and responsive. Other “soft skills,” such as time
management and anger management, are also developed. For the ex-offender population, this
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Recent work finds statistical discrimination from ban the box policies, especially for young African-American men
(Agan and Starr, 2018; Doleac and Hansen, 2020).
8
The description of America Works programs closely follows internal memos produced by Public/Private Ventures,
“Moving Men into the Mainstream: Study Brief,” April 2006.
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training may have particular resonance, as it reinforces coping and communications skills
learned in prison. America Works operates exclusively through performance-based contracts; the
firm does not receive payment for services until clients are placed and retained for a stipulated
period in a job. The company’s contracts with New York’s Human Resources Administration
(HRA) and other agencies raise the likelihood that the jobs that America Works finds for its
clients are good matches and that its clients are paid fairly and have opportunities to advance.
The company actively engages in finding further placements if initial placements are not
successful. America Works provides a guarantee to employers that it can successfully fill
positions and ensures that if problems arise, employers can discuss their concerns. Given
employers’ reluctance to consider ex-offenders, such a guarantee may be an important impetus to
hiring high-risk applicants.
Our evaluation context is relatively rare because of the randomized controlled trial
(RCT). Based upon the observed participant characteristics, we find that the randomization
appears to be carried out successful. The overall effect of intensive job assistance program is not
statistically significant. However, there are important differences between violent and nonviolent ex-offenders. The non-violent ex-offenders respond favorably to the intensive program.
Only 31 percent of non-violent ex-offenders in the intensive program were subsequently arrested
during the observation period, compared with 50 percent in the standard job assistance program.
In contrast, there was no statistically significant different for violent ex-offenders (45 percent
versus 43 percent). We also estimate the impacts on societal costs of recidivism. The evidence
supports the notion that intensive job assistance program is effective for non-violent exoffenders, but not effective for violent ex-offenders.
Section II of this paper summarizes existing evidence on reintegrating ex-offenders into
society. Section III describes the aforementioned randomized controlled trial and observations
from site visits. Section IV discusses various data limitations of the analysis and explains the
focus on criminal recidivism. Section V provides data description and empirical results. Section
VI illustrates the costs and benefits of enhanced job placement. Section VII offers concluding
thoughts.

5

II.

Existing Evidence on Reintegrating Ex-Offenders into Society
As Visher et al. (2005) note, community-based employment interventions for ex-

offenders date as far back as the 1960s, with a series of well-known federal job-training
programs following in the 1970s and 1980s, including the 1973 Comprehensive Employment
and Training Act (CETA), the 1983 Job Training and Partnership Act (JTPA), and the 1998
Workforce Investment Act (WIN). However, virtually all evaluations of prisoner reentry and
crime-abatement programs use nonexperimental techniques. Drake et al. (2009) identify 545
program evaluations, of which fewer than 5 percent used randomized controls. Cook et al. (2015)
identify only eight randomized trials prior to theirs, and only four of these (including Cook et al.
2015) were after 2000. As a consequence, relatively few recent studies use methods comparable
to our study.
Visher et al. (2005) conduct a meta-analysis of experimental evaluations of noncustodial
employment programs for adult ex-offenders, where the program had to include, at a minimum,
job training or placement. They note that only eight studies using random assignment could be
identified in English-language publications; they characterize the knowledge about the effects of
such programs as “hampered by inadequate contemporary research.” The eight studies,
implemented between 1971 and 1994, involved the Baltimore Living Insurance for Ex-Prisoners
(LIFE); Transitional Aid Research Project (TARP); National Supported Work Demonstration
(NSW), a job-training program for probationers; Job Training Partnership Act (JTPA);
JOBSTART; Job Corps; and Opportunity to Succeed (OPTS). In these studies, recidivism
measures included arrests, based on official records or self-reported behavior, for periods of up
to 36 months after participation in the employment program. Based on their meta-analysis,
Visher et al. conclude that the “eight interventions had no significant effect on the likelihood that
participants would be rearrested.”
Raphael (2010) and Cook et al. (2015) discuss a number of more recent experimental
studies of prisoner reentry efforts, including the Center for Employment Opportunities (CEO),
based in New York City. The one-year evaluations of this program show little impact on
recidivism (Bloom et al. 2007), but the second-year results showed that the treatment group was
approximately 8 percentage points less likely to be convicted of a crime and 7 percent less likely
to have experienced a post-release incarceration in prison or jail (Redcross et al. 2010). Raphael
concludes that there is some evidence that income support, transitional employment, and human
6

capital investments in ex-offenders may reduce criminal behavior and recidivism. Cook et al.
(2015) evaluate an experimental study implemented by the Wisconsin Department of Corrections
where “reach in” services were provided to violent offenders prior to release. They found that in
the one year window of their study, the treatment group saw 0.13 fewer arrests than the control
group. While the probability of being arrested within one year was lower for the treatment group,
and statistically significant, the gains were modest in practical terms.
Doleac (2018) provides a comprehensive review of interventions designed to reduce
recidivism and to promote employment, housing and health improvements among released
felons. In general, a variety of approaches toward re-employment have been pursued. Temporary
or transitional jobs, often through non-profit organizations, have been examined by Valentine,
Jacobs and Redcross (2015) who find little impact on employment or recidivism. Similarly,
Cook et al (2015) examine a transitional jobs program with more comprehensive services and
find short term employment significantly higher under the treatment, but longer run employment
does not appear to be effected. Bond et al. (2015) examine an intensive placement services
program and finds significant effects on employment, but insignificant effects on recidivism. In
contrast, Redcross, Barden and Bloom (2016) find that while employment effects of a
transitional jobs demonstration were short run, recidivism was reduced.
Several key points should be kept in mind about existing experimental literature. First,
almost all the studies are quite dated; the most recent study in Visher et al.’s meta-analysis was
from 1999. They note that the lack of federal funding for ex-offender programs in the 1980s
created a gap in the development and implementation of such programs. Second, the types of
offenses and number of arrests may matter for the efficacy of employment services. The OPTS
program, initiated in 1994, targeted ex-offenders with histories of alcohol and drug offenses. The
LIFE program targeted those with high likelihoods of future arrest for property crimes and no
history of drug or alcohol dependence. The NSW evaluation distinguished drug addicts from exoffenders.
Reintegrating ex-offenders back into mainstream employment has provided motivation
for recent “ban the box” policies. Nationwide, 35 states and over 150 cities and counties have
adopted such policies which remove conviction history from job applications and delay
background checks until later in the hiring process (Avery, 2019). However, such requirements
are less frequent for private employment, where only 13 states and 18 cities have such policies.
7

Such laws have become increasing popular in the last 10 years; prior to 2010, only two states had
such policies. There is a growing literature that has examined these policies using the quasiexperimental variation created across geography and over time. Recent work examines callback
rates in field experiments (Agan and Starr, 2018), and employment with observational data
(Doleac and Hansen, 2020). Other work has directly examined employment outcomes for those
with criminal histories with administrative data (Jackson and Zhao, 2017; Rose 2018).
Unfortunately, ban the box policies appear to be ineffective at improving employment outcomes,
and other policies that directly address employers’ concerns about ex-offenders are likely to be
more effective (Doleac, 2019).
This paper contributes to existing knowledge in several ways. The America Works RCT
is relatively recent compared with other published experimental estimates; the experimental
intervention occurred in 2009 and 2010, with recidivism measured through 2012. The
experiment examines the impact a costly short-term intervention – improving job readiness for
ex-offenders. We find heterogeneous effects based on offenders’ arrest histories (violent from
non-violent).
III.

Understanding the America Works Intervention

1. Description of the Randomized Control Trial
The RCT was overseen by Public/Private Ventures (P/PV), a nonprofit, nonpartisan,
social research and policy organization whose mission was to improve the effectiveness of
policies, programs, and community initiatives, especially as they affect vulnerable communities,
at the America Works offices in 2009 and 2010.9
Recruitment of this study’s 259 participants (which includes 254 ex-offenders and 5
hardship cases) took place at the New York offices of America Works from June 15, 2009, to
December 17, 2010. Participants were all men who had been released from a prison, jail, or
youth correctional facility within six months prior to their acceptance in the program. When a
potential participant was identified, America Works described its program and completed typical
intake procedures. America Works explained that a study of the program was being conducted
and that participants had a 50/50 chance of receiving “intensive” job assistance, while other

9

The discussion in this section follows directly from P/PV’s document “AW Study Rationale Brief,” August 2006.
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participants would receive “typical” job assistance. America Works then distributed written
informed consent forms to potential participants.
This RCT therefore aims to increase knowledge about the effectiveness of rapid
attachment to the labor market; given data constraints discussed later, the analysis here examines
the causal effect of intensive job assistance services on criminal recidivism. Although the
underlying causal mechanism is that such intensive assistance leads to better labor-market
outcomes and less dependence on government programs – both of which, in turn, lead to
reductions in recidivism – it is more difficult to convincingly examine intermediate steps due to
data availability.
Both the intensive job assistance program and the standard program were administered by
America Works. The intensive program included job-readiness training, job placement, and job
retention. The program typically lasted two weeks with nearly daily training. The training
typically focused on developing self-presentation skills through interview rehearsals and résumé
preparation. The training also included work on following directions and communications with
supervisors and co-workers. Following training, America Works arranges job interviews with
employers and, when the placement is made, stays in contact with new hires and their employers
for six months. The intensive job assistance program is unique, but well established. The
combination of both intensive training and the intensive placement and follow up services is
likely extremely important, and we describe some of the details of the program below. While this
study is unique in examining the role of this program, we are limited in that we cannot
differentiate the importance of the individual aspects of the program.
The key difference between the treatment and control group is the scope and focus of
services offered. P/PV documentation described enhanced services as: (1) intensive job-readiness
training, (2) rapid-attachment job-placement services, and (3) retention services. Typical services
involved: (1) job-readiness training and (2) self-directed job-search assistance.10
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On its website, America Works describes four steps that it takes to get program participants back to full-time work
rapidly. One step is a job-readiness program focusing on the “hard” and “soft” skills that employers are looking for.
A second is sending participants to interviews and matching them with specific jobs. A third is continuing support
for the participant after he finds a job (i.e., have a case manager follow up to ensure that the client is getting to work
on time each day). A final step is working with participants to ensure that they are taking advantage of opportunities
to increase their human capital (work-training programs, GED classes, etc.). See
https://web.archive.org/web/20160128180716/http://www.americaworks.com/partners/how-we-work (accessed July
12, 2019).
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2. Findings from Site Visits
During the initial evaluation, P/PV conducted a set of site visits to better understand the
“black box” of intensive job search assistance at America Works. We have reviewed 105 pages
of protocols and notes from 29 separate documents from site visits conducted between
November 7-9, 2005 to three separate America Works offices in the Bronx, Queens, and
Manhattan.
Standard job search assistance allows the client use of the resources at America Works
(AW), but is self-directed. Resources include job listings and access to computers and
telephones. The director of one AW office noted: “They can go online and look for jobs and
newspapers and we get the employment weekly and using monster.com. We have a resource
room. Participants use them. The internet is the most popular.” Given the limited resources of
AW clients, this increased accessibility potentially leads to jobs. However, one placement
specialist noted that at the AW office “there’s only two phones and four computers. Not 50-60
people are going to use those computers. Some clients have to wait to use the computer.”
Moreover, client motivation is critical to placement success. The same placement specialist noted
“Depending on the client, there are a couple that don’t want to do anything but a lot of others use
the newspapers and use the computer to come in and look for work.”
Intensive job search assistance provides a comprehensive package of services. There are
many differences from standard job search assistance, but one key difference is the follow-up
and communication with the employer partners in the intensive program, and value the long-run
relationship with employer partners. AW is well-incentivized to successfully place clients
because it is a for-profit company with performance-based contracts. As a consequence, the
“intensive” product consists of standard inputs into job search and also the culture at AW, which
may be thought of as the intensity.
The director of one AW office describes the intensive package of services as:
orientation/basic skills testing, then training, then job placement. Many hard-to-quantify features
enter into the intensive program. For example, AW’s “hands on” services focus on the barriers
their clients encounter in obtaining jobs. These include language obstacles (most of AW’s
employees are bilingual) and case management (difficulties with child care, transportation, and
parole officers). AW’s intensive program lowers the barriers for their clients to be successful at
10

jobs. For example the director mentioned “I tell the parole officers, ‘Use us instead of using you’
(to be the hammer making things happen with a client) and I tell them (officers) we’ll call you
with updates) and the employers will call you.” The “hands on” approach is also reflected in AW
employees having an open-door policy with clients, and providing cell phone numbers that
clients can reach them after-hours.
In the intensive program, barriers are lowered, for example, by the office director
personally reviewing the client’s resume. “I do all the resumes here because I really believe all
the candidates need a really good one. I want them to have one, that if it came across my desk,
how would I want it to look. It’s our name (America Works) - and I want it to look good. We
demand them to dress perfectly for an interview.”
The key theme, however, that was highlighted in virtually all site interviews was the
long-run relationship between AW and employers. The AW performance-based contracts with
intensive training provide stronger incentive for successful placements. Essentially, AW screens
clients based on skills, personality, motivation and background for each job placement, and
matches with employers where the likelihood of a long-run match is high. The employer partners
that AW interacts with desire reliable employees who will not create undue risk and are willing
to work long-term. As a consequence, some AW clients – such as those with extensive criminal
backgrounds or violent histories – may not be suitable matches for many employers. One
employer partner describes AW’s reputation relative to other placement services: “It’s nice to
have somebody who’s going to check everything for you. Like when we hire from outside
sources, we have problems. We like to hire people with recommendations.” The employer goes
on to mention “You know, we walk into homes that are million-dollar homes … that’s a liability
for us. So it’s nice to have somebody who checks their background from us” and “It’s important
to us they understand they know what they are getting into. We don’t like people leaving after a
week or two.”
In addition, AW provides follow-up after job placement, which the director calls “roster
management”, another key difference between intensive and standard assistance. “We set up a
roster-management system, because we have to stop all bad things from happening for those
individuals — there are important things HRA has to know about because HRA has multiple job
centers that are really welfare officers and those case managers there don’t have a clue what’s
been going on with the client. So it creates centralized case management database with HRA.”
11

The control group that gets standard job search assistance does not get such follow-up with roster
management: “I don’t like to see candidates stagnate which is an issue with this study because
the control group will be allowed to stagnate.” As an example of roster management, the director
mentioned “(the sales director is) talking to an employer and saying (an AW client) will begin as
a home health aid on Tuesday and I’m going to give you the name of follow-up person and then
we find out if there are any transportation problems, and we can call the client and find out how
it’s going. Every candidate has our cell phone number.”
IV.

Research Questions: Opportunities and Limitations
Although P/PV successfully carried out the randomized intervention of enhanced job

placement at the offices of America Works, collecting baseline demographic and socioeconomic
data at the time of the trial as well, P/PV was unable to gather data on certain outcomes that
might have resulted from the intervention–outcomes pertaining to the labor market, use of
government welfare programs, and criminal activity. Such data are necessary to determine if
enhanced services have beneficial effects in those areas. Although gathering data on welfare use
and labor-market outcomes was deemed infeasible, we were able to obtain comprehensive data
on criminal histories, both before and after the experimental intervention. Criminal history record
searches were conducted through the New York State Unified Court System in early August
2012. The court system website describes the record search:
“The New York State Office of Court Administration (OCA) provides a New York
Statewide criminal history record search (CHRS) for a fee of $65.00. 11 One can submit a
CHRS request via the on-line Direct Access program or by mailing in a CHRS
application form. The search criteria are based on an exact match of Name and date of
birth. The search results are public records relating to open/pending and convictions in
criminal cases originating from courts of all 62 counties.”
We obtained criminal histories for felony and misdemeanor cases that occurred in New York for
the study’s 259 participants; the analysis uses 219 participants with successful links between the
data sources. Although criminal history records are available from all counties, initial data
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See https://web.archive.org/web/20180510010201/http://ww2.nycourts.gov/apps/chrs/index.shtml (accessed July
12, 2019).
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collection started at different points in time (from 1978 to 1993).

V.

Data Description and Recidivism Results

1. Data Description
Data provided on the ex-offenders derive from two main sources. The primary source,
which identifies ex-offenders in the experiment, is the baseline survey administered at the initial
intake interview, as well as information on whether individuals were assigned to the intensive
job assistance program (treatment group) or the standard program (control group). While data
collected by P/PV concerning the treatment and control groups are complete, the baseline survey
data were often incomplete, with many missing observations on specific questions. The primary
data were then matched to public records on arrests and convictions (primarily from New York
State) to form a criminal history of each participant. That history starts prior to the experiment
and ends in July 2012.
As noted, 259 ex-offenders were enlisted for the study (including five “hardship cases”).
They joined the study on a rolling basis from June 15, 2009, to December 17, 2010, with 130 in
the treatment group and 129 in the control group. From this initial group of 259 ex-offenders, we
were able to obtain accurate redacted arrest records for 219 of them, using public records from
New York’s OCA. Overall, 1,027 pages of arrest records were collected for the 219 individuals.
Because arrest records for the remaining 40 ex-offenders could not be found, those individuals
were excluded from the analysis. The original randomization resulted in 50.2% of the
participants assigned to the treatment group (130/259). After merging with arrest records, 50.2%
(110/219) of the remaining observations are in the treatment group.
Appendix Table 1 examines whether the 40 individuals for whom arrest records were
unavailable have any significant differences in either treatment group or control variables. We
regress an indicator for inclusion in the cases above on three sets of control variables. In all three
models the regressions were insignificant (F-tests well below conventional rejection levels,
reported in last row). While not reported here, additional robustness tests for all main results
were performed by using Heckman sample selection models. Since the first stage – reported in
Appendix Table 1 – has no explanatory power, it is unsurprising that the results were robust to
controlling for selection. We found no evidence of selection into finding arrest records.
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Using these detailed arrest records, the 219 remaining participants in the study were
organized into two categories based on criminal acts prior to enrollment in the America Works
experiment: Violent ex-offenders and non-violent ex-offenders. When classifying study
participants in these two groups, we assumed a hierarchical structure under which an individual
was included in only one group. If the individual had been arrested for a violent crime and a
property crime, he would be classified in the violent bin. Violent ex-offenders were defined as
those who had committed any violent crime, as defined by the FBI Uniform Crime Reports, prior
to participating in the America Works experiment. Under that definition, violent crime includes
murder, rape/sexual assault, assault, and robbery. Non-violent ex-offenders include those who
committed crimes against another person’s property (burglary, grand larceny, trespassing, etc.),
drug ex-offenders who had been convicted of selling or possessing controlled substances, and
petty crimes including traffic/motor vehicle violations, criminal contempt, and harassment.
2. Summary Statistics
We create several variables that align arrests (or charges) with the timing of the
experimental intervention that was rolled out from June 2009 to December 2010. We create
variables for whether the participant was subsequently arrested, as well as the number of arrests,
and for instances when demographics were missing from the baseline survey, we replaced the
variable with imputation methods described below (in the regressions).
An important, necessary step for causal inference is confidence that the experimental
intervention was assigned randomly. We explore this in Table 1, where we examine the
relationship between being assigned to the treatment group and the control variables. With minor
exceptions, the individual covariates appear unrelated to assignment of experimental treatment to
intensive job assistance. We estimate the model for the full sample, as well as each of the
subgroups: violent and non-violent offenders. In all three models, the F-tests of significance of
the characteristics to predict the treatment (see last row) were well below conventional rejection
levels. We cannot reject the null that the characteristics as a whole do not predict treatment
status. Additionally, we performed a joint multi-variate test comparing the treatment and control
group characteristics, the F(21,195) test statistic was 0.71 which has a p-value of 0.82. We accept
the null that the means of these characteristics are not different across the two treatment
categories. There is no evidence against random assignment of treatment.
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We show summary statistics on arrests and baseline demographics in Table 2, for the full
sample, as well as violent and non-violent ex-offenders. Recidivism – defined as being arrested
after the experimental intervention – was observed for at least 18 months and as many as 36
months after the intervention. The earliest participants (enrolled in June 2009) were observed for
the full 36 months while the latest participants (enrolled in December 2010) were only observed
for 18 months. Criminal histories were obtained in early August 2012; in the analysis below, the
cutoff for being observed is July 31, 2012. We have also tested, and the average length of
observation is not different between the treatment and control group.
A baseline survey was administered to all participants regardless of assignment of
standard or intensive job assistance. It asked straightforward demographic and socioeconomic
questions, as well as asking respondents to self-report their criminal histories, participation in
prison programs, and substance abuse/mental health.
The average age of ex-offenders was 39, with little variation across treatment and control
groups. Only 7.4 percent of participants were married: those in the control group were slightly
more likely to be married (8.3 percent) than those in the treatment group (6.4 percent). Many
respondents did not provide an answer for education level; only 129 (58 percent) of ex-offenders
responded. Of those who did, over 72 percent reported having a high school or high school–
equivalent degree, with the treatment group having a slightly higher rate, nearly 74 percent.
Non-response to race/ethnicity was also high, with 136 ex-offenders providing an answer.
The vast majority (over 73 percent) reported African-American/black and over 23 percent
reported Hispanic. Nearly 73 percent of ex-offenders possessed some kind of vocational training,
and more than 60 percent had participated in job-training programs (of which nearly 42 percent
participated while in prison). Fully 62 percent of the ex-offenders participated in a prerelease
program. Nearly 73 percent reported receiving drug or alcohol treatment. The demographics
from baseline survey makes clear that this group would struggle to obtain work.
Criminal histories were obtained from public records in New York State and merged with
data collected by P/PV. Since criminal histories were limited to arrests and charges in New York,
they represent an understatement if arrests and charges occurred in other states or were
associated with aliases not linked to the individual. For both the treatment and control group,
participants had approximately 6 arrests prior to the intervention.
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Overall, as can be seen in the last row of Table 2, fully 70% of our observations had at
least one missing value for these covariates. In order to address this, we used the multiple
imputation procedure in Stata. This procedure first estimates models for each of the missing
variables. Logit models were used in this step. The multiple imputation procedure then generates
imputations which include randomness comparable to that of the observed data (for example, for
a dummy variable, the first stage model provides the predicted probability for each observation,
Stata then draws from a Bernoulli using those probabilities). The model is then estimated using
these imputations. The procedure is repeated, to arrive at multiple estimates and Rubin’s Rule is
used to combine the estimates and estimate the standard errors. The Rubin’s Rule standard errors
reflect not only the usual sampling variation, but variation due to the imputation approach as
well. All estimates reported here using covariates employ this approach (including appendix
tables). While not reported here, three other approaches were considered: complete case,
replacing the missing data with the sample mean, and replacing the missing data with the sample
mean and including a dummy indicating missing data. All results are robust across these
approaches.
3. Recidivism and Number of Arrests
In our first set of regressions in Table 3, we examine the likelihood of subsequently getting
arrested after the job assistance intervention. In all columns, we estimate linear probability
models with heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors. For the full sample, in column 1, the
overall re-arrest rate is 47.5%. Intensive job assistance insignificantly lowers the arrest rate 7.7
percentage points. In columns 2 and 3, we separate the sample of ex-offenders into the violent
(126) and non-violent (93) groups based on their arrest record prior to treatment. The impact of
intensive job assistance on arrest rates of violent ex-offenders is insignificant and substantively
small; the coefficient estimate would imply a reduction in the likelihood of arrest of 1.6
percentage points from a mean of 51.4%. For non-violent ex-offenders, intensive job assistance
causes a 16.5 percentage point reduction in the likelihood of getting arrested, from a mean of
43.6%. The latter two columns show an economically important difference in the impact of the
intervention based on the nature of the offense.
In essence, our findings show that moderately-costly intensive job assistance is effective for
ex-offenders who might be easier to re-integrate into the labor force in the first place (non16

violent ex-offenders), which in turn would lead to higher (unobserved) labor force participation
and lower observed recidivism (Schnepel, 2018; Yang, 2017). In contrast, it may be the case that
such training leads to less successful re-integration into the labor force for violent ex-offenders
who pose substantially more downside risk to the firm, or it may be that possible the relationship
between labor force participation and recidivism is fundamentally weaker for those with violent
histories.
In columns (4)-(5), we add individual covariates to the recidivism model for violent and nonviolent ex-offenders. We include number of pre-intervention arrests, age, marital status,
education, drug/alcohol treatment, race/ethnicity, and various training programs that could be
done in prison. Most of these individual characteristics insignificantly affect the likelihood of
recidivism for violent ex-offenders, and their inclusion does not affect the findings about the
ineffectiveness of intensive job assistance. However, the overall explanatory power of the model
increases (via R-squared). The coefficient estimate for non-violent ex-offenders becomes
statistically significant, but the magnitude does not change substantively and is consistent with
the premise that treatment was random. The one noteworthy result is that the number of arrests
prior to the intervention is strongly related to subsequent recidivism; each additional arrest raises
likelihood of recidivism by 3.6 percentage points (and violent ex-offenders have, on average, 6.1
prior arrests). For non-violent ex-offenders, the impact of intensive job assistance is slightly
larger, reducing the likelihood of recidivism by 19.2 percentage points (p=0.07). Few of the
individual characteristics appear to affect recidivism, although each additional arrest prior to the
intervention raises the likelihood of recidivism by 3.4 percentage points (and they have, on
average, 5.9 prior arrests).
Finally, in columns (6)-(7), we use regression-adjusted inverse probability weighted average
treatment effect estimators. This approach offers the advantage of both a more flexible functional
form (through the regression adjustment), and reweighting by any differences in treatment
assignment characteristics (through the inverse probability weights). We include the same
covariates as in columns (4) and (5). For violent ex-offenders in column (6), the treatment effects
model again shows a small and insignificant reduction in recidivism (of 3.2 percentage points,
p=0.75). For non-violent ex-offenders in column (7), we observe a reduction in recidivism of
18.1 percentage points (p=0.066), very similar to the regression results in column (5).
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We next examine the number of post-intervention arrests in Table 4. We note that coefficient
estimates here may be less comparable for violent and non-violent offenders, if violent offenders
are likely to be re-arrested for more serious offenses, and as a consequence, to be incarcerated for
longer periods of time in the post-intervention period, thus having fewer chances to be rearrested. We estimate Tobit models since nearly half the sample are not re-arrested (and thus
have a zero) during our window (see Table 2). This constitutes a censored model. Our results are
shown for the full sample in column (1), as well as separated for violent (column 2 and 4) and
non-violent (column 3 and 5) ex-offenders (both with and without individual covariates). In the
simple models with no covariates, the coefficient on treatment is -0.63 for violent offenders and 0.83 for non-violent offenders. When control variables are included, the coefficient on violent
offenders is -0.16 while the coefficient on non-violent offenders is -1.04 with a p-value of 0.040.
Like arrests, we find evidence that the treatment reduces recidivism for the non-violent
offenders, but no evidence of that claim for the violent offenders.
We have performed a number of robustness checks.12 First, we estimate the full regression
model for any arrest without including observations where the control variables were imputed.
The exercise reduces sample size, and as expected, statistical significance. However, the estimate
of the treatment coefficient for non-violent ex-offenders remains negative (and larger at -0.52),
while the estimate for the treatment effect for violent ex-offenders is positive at 0.05. We also
estimate a logit model for the arrests and obtain a marginal effect of -0.14 for the non-violent exoffenders with a p-value of 0.055, while the estimated marginal effect for the violent offenders is
insignificant and small at 0.004. A number of different options for estimation of treatment
effects, such as inverse probability weighting, matching and regression adjustment, were
considered. Under the assumption of random assignment, all should be equivalent estimators to
the simple differences in means. Regression adjusting (as in the OLS estimates), increased
statistical significance, but little impact on magnitudes. Other approaches had similar impact on
effects, but varied in precision, as would be expected. In summary, our results appear to be quite
robust to a number of modeling decisions.

12

All output from the robustness checks is available from the authors.
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VI.

Costs and Benefits of Enhanced Job Placement
The principal finding is best captured in the recidivism measures. However, given that it

costs approximately $5,000 to place someone in a job through an intensive America Works job
assistance program, it is important to obtain some estimate of the social benefit of the reduction
in arrests.13 Establishing social costs of crime is challenging. We use existing studies, along with
the nature of the arrest and charges, to assign a dollar value for each crime committed by an exoffender, both pre- and post-treatment. Appendix Table 2 summarizes the estimated social costs
for various crime categories from eight different studies. The social costs for violent crimes –
especially murder – are extremely high, while many nonviolent crimes impose relatively modest
social costs. In the following analysis, we rely on estimates in comprehensive studies by Cohen
and Piquero (2009) and McCollister et al. (2010).
Our analysis proceeds in several steps. First, we know all charges (both pre- and postintervention) from the arrest records for the 219 successfully merged individuals. We classify the
charges related with arrests (type and quantity) in terms of FBI classifications for crimes,
including several miscellaneous categories. Second, each charge associated with an arrest was
assigned a social cost value derived from Cohen and Piquero (2009), which is column 4 in
Appendix Table 2. This study was chosen because it had the most comprehensive list of social
costs for crimes out of the eight studies. When a cost estimate was unavailable, we used
estimates from McCollister et al. (2010). This allowed us to additionally provide social costs for
household crimes, embezzlement, stolen property, and forgery and counterfeiting. Many of the
estimates by crime category are fairly similar, with the notable exception of murder (where we
use a social cost of crime of $4.6 million for the 30 recorded murders/other charges related to
loss of life from Cohen and Piquero (2009) rather than $9.0 million from McColister et al.
(2010)). Finally, based on the social costs associated with the charges, we compute the total
social cost of crime (both pre- and post-treatment).
We observed in Table 3 that recidivism fell for non-violent offenders, and that total
arrests were responsive to the intervention in Table 4. However, the analysis is silent on whether
the nature of crimes committed changed due to the intensive job training. One important
assumption in the crime analysis – for recidivism, arrests, or especially for the social cost of

13

For the cost estimate on the intensive job placement program from America Works, see Cove (2013).
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crime – is that arrests reflect the underlying crime on the ground. To the extent that arrest rates
differed by individual covariates (for example, by race, where we expect that African-American
men might be arrested at greater rates for the same offense than white men), it may well be the
case that we misstate the social cost of crime. However, Table 4 suggests no difference in arrests
within this sample by race/ethnicity, nor is the experimental intervention of intensive job training
differentially administered by race.
For the full sample, the social cost of crimes committed post-treatment was
approximately $103,000. For the roughly half of ex-offenders who were re-arrested, the average
social cost exceed $219,000. The median social cost, conditional on arrest, is $7,500, while the
75th percentile exceeds $230,000. Assuming that arrests reflect overall crime activity, a
significant percentage of ex-offenders who get arrested impose large societal costs. Given the
large number of zeros in our data (due to not being arrested), Table 5 estimates Tobit models
(assuming zero social cost for participants without arrests). The outcome of interest is the social
cost of the crimes (arrests) committed, post-treatment. For the full sample (without covariates),
column (1) reveals that the intensive job assistance treatment reduced social costs by more than
$151,000 (p=0.12, with 116 left-censored observations out of 219). The reduced cost is much
lower for violent ex-offenders, and imprecisely estimated in column (2), while the reduced cost
is much larger in magnitude – nearly $324,000 in social costs avoided (p=0.12) – for non-violent
ex-offenders who received the treatment in column (3). Adding individual characteristics does
change the magnitudes, but not the substantive conclusions in columns (4) and (5). For violent
ex-offenders, the results are imprecise. For non-violent ex-offenders, social costs are
significantly reduced by more than $436,000 (p=0.067) from the intervention. As in earlier
tables, many of the covariates are weakly related to social costs. Consistent with earlier tables,
the number of arrests prior to treatment – for both violent and non-violent ex-offenders –
significantly increases subsequent social costs after the treatment.
These results help establish the cost-benefit analysis of the America Works program.
Treatment cost for one ex-offender in the intensive program is approximately $5,000 (Cove,
2013), meaning this is also the upper bound on the marginal cost of the intensive intervention.
While caution should be taken in using these estimates, the overall result is striking: providing
intensive job-training and job-search services to non-violent ex-offenders more than pays for
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itself by reducing the social costs of crime. However, there is little evidence that such treatment
affects violent ex-offenders.

VII.

Conclusion
This paper examines the impact of intensive job-readiness training and job-search

assistance on criminal recidivism and labor-market outcomes among ex-offenders, using data
from a randomized controlled trial conducted at the America Works job-placement agency.
Overall, such training and assistance had no effect on recidivism. This result nonetheless masks
substantial heterogeneity of outcomes.
For the roughly half of program participants with nonviolent arrest histories, intensive
job-search assistance significantly decreased the likelihood of recidivism. Only 31 percent of
nonviolent offenders receiving intensive job training were subsequently rearrested; among
participants receiving standard training, on the other hand, 50 percent were subsequently
rearrested. Such results suggest that enhanced job-search assistance is most effective for the
easiest of the hard-to-serve population (i.e., those without histories of violence and few charges)
and far less effective for clients with more difficult histories of arrests and charges.
Although these results on criminal recidivism are noteworthy, we were unable to answer
a number of other important questions originally posed when P/PV set up the experiment,
including: (1) Did participation in America Works intensive job assistance program increase exoffenders’ likelihood of finding and maintaining employment over those who did not receive
intensive services? (2) Did the intensive program help ex-offenders find jobs of a higher quality
than they would otherwise have found on their own? (3) Did participation in the intensive
program reduce reliance on cash assistance from the government? (4) Did participation increase
formal participation in the child-support system? Data constraints preclude us from answering
these questions. To address them, we would require high-quality administrative data or the
opportunity to re-interview ex-offenders many years after initial contact with America Works.
Such approaches, while conceptually possible, are difficult, given budgetary and privacy
constraints.
Two of additional limitations should be acknowledged. First, the program took place
during the Great Recession. It is possible that this reduced the effectiveness of the program.
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Second, the size of the experiment was modest and clearly impacted the conclusions we could
draw. Further there was some attrition from the data collection process which may be important.
Nonetheless, this paper’s findings on recidivism suggest that the obvious path to
improvement in the lives of ex-offenders – as well as the welfare of society at large – runs
through the labor market.
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Table 1
Treatment balance – Do observable, fixed characteristics influence likelihood of intensive intervention?
All
Violent
Non-Violent
Total Arrests, Pre-intervention
-0.005
-0.007
0.006
(0.006)
(0.008)
(0.010)
Total Days Observed (00’s)
0.016
-0.003
0.054
(0.026)
(0.033)
(0.047)
Age
0.001
0.000
-0.002
(0.005)
(0.007)
(0.009)
Married
-0.003
-0.011
0.036
(0.122)
(0.252)
(0.203)
Hispanic
-0.017
0.018
-0.047
(0.123)
(0.208)
(0.206)
Other Race
0.04
0.016
0.113
(0.110)
(0.220)
(0.152)
Disability
0.021
0.025
-0.137
(0.145)
(0.193)
(0.186)
High School/GED Ed
0.016
-0.041
0.01
(0.105)
(0.158)
(0.178)
Drug/Alcohol Treatment
-0.063
-0.026
-0.064
(0.088)
(0.131)
(0.181)
Vocational Training
-0.049
0.097
-0.135
(0.103)
(0.132)
(0.202)
Educational Training
0.038
-0.053
0.063
(0.092)
(0.120)
(0.162)
Job Training
0.024
-0.181
0.225
(0.104)
(0.140)
(0.158)
Life Skills
-0.010
0.047
-0.162
(0.098)
(0.137)
(0.184)
Religious Studies
-0.07
0.01
-0.107
(0.083)
(0.104)
(0.153)
Prisoner Assistance
-0.035
-0.068
-0.13
(0.095)
(0.129)
(0.170)
Other Self Help
0.08
0.031
0.222
(0.096)
(0.142)
(0.146)
Ethnic Organization
0.072
-0.023
0.205
(0.104)
(0.144)
(0.201)
Pre-Release Program
0.029
0.265*
-0.243
(0.092)
(0.126)
(0.163)
Community Acts
0.197*
0.337*
0.225
(0.099)
(0.135)
(0.183)
Arts & Crafts
0.006
-0.106
0.21
(0.108)
(0.155)
(0.172)
Paid Work
-0.032
0.002
-0.068
(0.076)
(0.105)
(0.127)
Prior Job Training
0.124
0.214*
-0.055
(0.075)
(0.099)
(0.135)
Any Missing
0.021
-0.033
0.092
(0.083)
(0.116)
(0.135)
Constant
0.279
0.386
0.144
(0.299)
(0.413)
(0.567)
F-test
0.69
1.11
0.82
p-value of F
0.85
0.35
0.70
N
219
126
93
Notes: Authors’ analysis of participants in the America Works experiment using linear probability model, where the outcome
of interest is assignment to the intensive job assistance program (in contrast to standard assistance). With the exception of
arrests, all individual characteristics are from the baseline intake interview. Pre-treatment arrests are derived from
administrative arrest records obtained in August 2012, along with date of randomized job assistance intervention (between
June 2009 and December 2010. * p<0.05, ** p<0.01.
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Table 2
Summary Statistics
Standard Job
Intensive Job
Assistance
Assistance
Sample
Sample
Sample
Mean
Mean
Mean
size
size
size
Treatment Status (Intensive Job Assistance)
219
0.502
109
0.000
110
1.000
Arrested, Post-Intervention
219
0.475
109
0.514
110
0.436
Total Arrests, Post-Intervention
219
1.068
109
1.266
110
0.873
Total Arrests, Pre-Intervention
219
6.05
109
6.165
110
5.936
Violent Offender
219
0.575
109
0.56
110
0.591
Non-Violent Offender
219
0.425
109
0.44
110
0.409
Total Days Observed
219
879.1
109
875.3
110
883
Age
218
39.17
109
38.88
109
39.45
Married
134
0.119
66
0.136
68
0.103
Black
136
0.735
67
0.731
69
0.739
Hispanic
136
0.235
67
0.239
69
0.232
White
136
0.0221
67
0.015
69
0.029
Asian
136
0.0074
67
0.015
69
0.000
American Indian
136
0.0221
67
0.015
69
0.029
Pacific Islander
136
0.0074
67
0.000
69
0.015
Disability
198
0.091
97
0.093
101
0.089
High School/GED Ed
129
0.721
64
0.703
65
0.738
Drug/Alcohol Treatment
125
0.728
60
0.717
65
0.738
Vocational Training
215
0.73
107
0.720
108
0.741
Educational Training
212
0.608
106
0.566
106
0.651
Job Training
216
0.616
106
0.557
110
0.673
Life Skills
211
0.441
104
0.394
107
0.486
Religious Studies
206
0.442
101
0.436
105
0.448
Prisoner Assistance
214
0.327
106
0.283
108
0.37
Other Self Help
217
0.327
107
0.262
110
0.391
Ethnic Organization
213
0.183
104
0.135
109
0.229
Pre-Release Program
216
0.616
106
0.557
110
0.673
Community Acts
213
0.258
105
0.171
108
0.343
Arts & Crafts
210
0.167
105
0.143
105
0.19
Paid Work
213
0.408
105
0.429
108
0.389
Prior Job Training
211
0.417
105
0.362
106
0.472
Any Missing
219
0.712
109
0.716
110
0.709
Notes: Authors’ tabulations of baseline data and administrative arrest data. In the subsequent regressions,
individuals with missing data from baseline are assigned values based on Stata’s multiple imputation procedure.
Full Sample
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Table 3
Arrested Post-Intervention? (1=yes, 0=no)
Linear probability model

Intensive Job Assistance

All

Violent

Non-Violent

Violent

Non-Violent

-0.077
(0.068)

-0.016
(0.090)

-0.165
(0.103)

0.514***
(0.048)
0.006

0.508***
(0.065)
0.0003

0.521***
(0.073)
0.0277

-0.030
(0.101)
0.036***
(0.007)
-0.007
(0.006)
-0.071
(0.246)
-0.034
(0.200)
0.096
(0.193)
0.092
(0.171)
-0.082
(0.153)
-0.120
(0.129)
0.005
(0.129)
-0.091
(0.126)
0.095
(0.131)
0.027
(0.114)
0.023
(0.111)
0.009
(0.132)
0.007
(0.136)
-0.139
(0.119)
0.040
(0.146)
0.130
(0.133)
0.089
(0.141)
-0.025
(0.111)
0.062
(0.097)
0.596**
(0.280)
0.246

-0.192*
(0.105)
0.034***
(0.010)
0.002
(0.006)
0.213
(0.217)
0.051
(0.144)
-0.106
(0.128)
0.152
(0.160)
-0.021
(0.149)
-0.155
(0.136)
0.002
(0.143)
0.039
(0.136)
0.014
(0.134)
0.120
(0.158)
-0.202*
(0.119)
-0.141
(0.143)
0.120
(0.141)
0.064
(0.154)
-0.163
(0.130)
0.108
(0.146)
-0.200
(0.208)
0.025
(0.116)
0.186
(0.112)
0.409
(0.303)
0.357

Total Arrests, PreIntervention
Age
Married
Hispanic
Other Race
Disability
High School/GED Ed
Drug/Alcohol Treatment
Vocational Training
Educational Training
Job Training
Life Skills
Religious Studies
Prisoner Assistance
Other Self Help
Ethnic Organization
Pre-Release Program
Community Acts
Arts & Crafts
Paid Work
Prior Job Training
Constant
𝑅2

Treatment Effects
Estimator
Violent
NonViolent
0.032
-0.181*
(0.101)
(0.099)

0.441
(0.073)
---

0.509***
(0.073)
---

Notes: Authors’ analysis of 219 participants in the America Works experiment, with 126 violent and 93 non-violent exoffenders. Linear probability model is used in columns (1)-(5) with heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors, and a
regression adjusted-inverse probability weighted treatment effects model in columns (6)-(7), where the outcome of interest is
whether the ex-offender was arrested any time after the experimental intervention. With the exception of pre-intervention
arrests, all individual characteristics are from the baseline intake interview. Pre-treatment arrests are derived from
administrative arrest records obtained in August 2012, along with date of randomized job assistance intervention (between
June 2009 and December 2010). * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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Table 4
Tobit, Number of Arrests, Post-Intervention
All
Violent
Non-Violent
Intensive Job Assistance

-0.772
(0.510)

-0.634
(0.766)

Violent

Non-Violent

-0.158
-1.037**
(0.704)
(0.495)
Total Arrests, Pre-Intervention
0.343***
0.158***
(0.0593)
(0.0422)
Age
-0.0578
-0.00737
(0.0462)
(0.0330)
Married
-2.050
0.248
(1.713)
(0.801)
Hispanic
-0.156
-0.374
(1.384)
(0.865)
Other Race
-0.758
-0.762
(1.250)
(0.793)
Disability
0.00297
0.947
(1.365)
(0.887)
High School/GED Ed
-1.163
0.128
(1.160)
(0.855)
Drug/Alcohol Treatment
-0.488
-0.181
(1.200)
(0.692)
Vocational Training
-0.872
0.0184
(1.065)
(0.705)
Educational Training
0.199
0.276
(0.859)
(0.596)
Job Training
1.078
0.118
(1.107)
(0.730)
Life Skills
0.147
1.071
(0.779)
(0.700)
Religious Studies
-1.011
-0.413
(0.770)
(0.581)
Prisoner Assistance
0.511
-1.206*
(0.967)
(0.690)
Other Self Help
-0.0142
0.382
(1.033)
(0.641)
Ethnic Organization
0.0822
0.247
(0.975)
(0.913)
Pre-Release Program
0.0992
-1.325**
(1.010)
(0.646)
Community Acts
-0.280
1.113
(0.992)
(0.727)
Arts & Crafts
0.311
-1.383*
(1.069)
(0.781)
Paid Work
0.102
0.0697
(0.765)
(0.503)
Prior Job Training
-0.0110
0.203
(0.768)
(0.507)
Constant
-0.0413
-0.009
0.134
1.252
0.363
(0.374)
(0.575)
(0.373)
(2.001)
(0.214)
Notes: Authors’ analysis of 219 participants in the America Works experiment, with 126 violent and 93 non-violent exoffenders. Tobit model is used in columns (1)-(5), where the outcome of interest is number of post-intervention arrests. With
the exception of pre-intervention arrests, all individual characteristics are from the baseline intake interview. Pre-treatment
arrests are derived from administrative arrest records obtained in August 2012, along with date of randomized job assistance
intervention (between June 2009 and December 2010). * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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-0.831
(0.529)

Table 5
Tobit, Social Cost of Arrests, Post-Intervention
All
Violent
Non-Violent
Intensive Job Assistance

-151912
(97434)

-67279
(89230)

Violent

Non-Violent

-16754
-436159*
(95163)
(234214)
Total Arrests, Pre-Intervention
21867**
41836**
(8440)
(19452)
Age
-10520
-3962
(6434)
(15073)
Married
11767
87298
(332718)
(422191)
Hispanic
-59511
-178521
(275361)
(302100)
Other Race
125925
-347999
(223392)
(303258)
Disability
28800
-89915
(223572)
(407359)
High School/GED Ed
-182336
-350856
(202560)
(271786)
Drug/Alcohol Treatment
-124627
67005
(195113)
(324127)
Vocational Training
-167123
-13851
(128899)
(331541)
Educational Training
71944
336952
(134117)
(279632)
Job Training
167637
-58268
(149847)
(322574)
Life Skills
-12979
399231
(110823)
(368293)
Religious Studies
-60511
-443532
(107111)
(283175)
Prisoner Assistance
82086
-417627
(120257)
(331298)
Other Self Help
16501
230482
(132226)
(310842)
Ethnic Organization
-143356
149160
(129412)
(423265)
Pre-Release Program
-88160
-535832*
(153797)
(315368)
Community Acts
32726
61324
(119522)
(370593)
Arts & Crafts
129643
-274939
(129901)
(364661)
Paid Work
-56795
-116456
(104278)
(225356)
Prior Job Training
22021
114917
(134644)
(239255)
Constant
-132833
-56689
-219198
417632
325644
(71261)
(66826)
(144298)
(269174)
(87585)
Notes: Authors’ analysis of 219 participants in the America Works experiment, with 126 violent and 93 non-violent exoffenders. Tobit model is used in columns (1)-(5), where the outcome of interest is social cost of post-intervention arrests.
With the exception of pre-intervention arrests, all individual characteristics are from the baseline intake interview. Pretreatment arrests are derived from administrative arrest records obtained in August 2012, along with date of randomized job
assistance intervention (between June 2009 and December 2010). * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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-323917
(205949)

Appendix Table 1: Analysis of Non-followed

Intensive Job Assistance

(1)

(2)

0.008
(0.044)

-0.000
(0.043)
0.005
(0.003)
0.101
(0.057)
-0.000
(0.100)
-0.049
(0.079)
-0.080
(0.088)
0.079
(0.065)
0.051
(0.096)

(3)

0.008
(0.044)
Age
0.005
(0.003)
Married
0.135
(0.071)
Hispanic
-0.011
(0.093)
Other Race
-0.032
(0.071)
Disability
-0.067
(0.086)
High School/GED Ed
0.076
(0.069)
Drug/Alcohol Treatment
0.046
(0.098)
Vocational Training
0.056
(0.068)
Educational Training
0.010
(0.055)
Job Training
0.085
(0.066)
Life Skills
-0.078
(0.065)
Religious Studies
-0.045
(0.050)
Prisoner Assistance
0.102
(0.064)
Other Self Help
-0.014
(0.065)
Ethnic Organization
-0.088
(0.076)
Pre-Release Program
-0.078
(0.064)
Community Acts
0.052
(0.062)
Arts & Crafts
-0.047
(0.074)
Paid Work
0.019
(0.048)
Prior Job Training
0.051
(0.045)
Constant
0.852**
0.587**
0.550**
(0.032)
(0.139)
(0.152)
F-test
0.03
0.93
0.98
p-value of F-test
0.86
0.49
0.49
N
256
256
256
Notes: Authors’ analysis of 256 initial participants in the America Works experiment using linear probability model, where
the outcome of interest is whether arrest records could be matched to the provided individual identifiers. Fully 219
participants could be matched with arrest records and were included in the subsequent analysis. Individual characteristics are
from the baseline intake interview. * p<0.05, ** p<0.01.
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Appendix Table 2
Summary of Unit Crime Cost Estimates Reported in Literature (2008 dollars)

(1)
Aos et al.
(2001)
4,423,614

(2)
Cohen
(1988)

(3)
Cohen et al.
(2004)
11,350,687

(4)
Cohen &
Piquero
(2009)
4.6–5
million

(5)
Miller et
al.
(1993)
4,144,677

(6)
Miller et
al.
(1996)
4,380,559

Rape/Sexual assault

369,739

97,962

286,277

290,000

80,403

124,419

Aggravated assault

105,545

23,025

84,555

85,000

24,987.00

21,451

76,829

107,020

39,000

33,036

18,591

33,143

42,310

115,000

41,900

53,629

Type of Crime
Murder

Armed robbery
Robbery

(7)
Rajkumar
& French
(1997)

(8)
McCollister et al.
(2010)
8,982,907
240,776

280,000
219,286

24,168

280,237

Arson
Larceny/Theft

21,103

344

4,000

529

1,104

3,532

Motor vehicle theft

6,006

17,000

5,720

1,723

10,772

Household

2,575

2,145

1,974

6,462

30,197

Drunk-driving
crash

60,000

Burglary

25,000

35,000

Embezzlement

5,480

Fraud
Stolen property

5,500
22,739

Forgery and
counterfeiting
Vandalism
Prostitution, false
statements, etc.

2,000

5,032
151

7,974

833

5,265
4,860

500

Note: Unit cost values inflated using Bureau of Labor Statistics inflation calculator based on consumer price index (CPI). U.S. Department of
Labor 2008; see http://www.bls.gov/data/inflation_calculator.htm.
(1) Estimates combine Washington State and local governmental operating costs paid by taxpayers (originally reported in 2000 dollars) and
costs incurred by crime victims from Miller et al. 1996 (reported in 1995 dollars). Values reflect present value cost of each offense used to
calculate the benefits of adult community-based substance-abuse treatment. Cost per assault is for aggravated assault.
(2) Original estimates in 1985 dollars. Jury compensation approach to estimate monetary value for pain, suffering, and fear in personal injury
cases.
(3) Original crime cost estimates in 2000 dollars. Estimated using contingent valuation method (willingness to pay).
(4) Additional estimates to (2) by including (3).
(5) Original estimates in 1989 dollars. Victim costs of violent crime and resulting injuries.
(6) Original estimates in 1993 dollars. Estimates reflect victim losses including medical and mental health–care spending, tangible losses, and
reduced quality of life. Excludes adjudication and sanctioning.
(7) Original crime cost estimates reported in 1992 dollars. Estimated using combination of cost of illness and jury compensation approaches.
Cost of assault is for aggravated assault.
(8) Unit cost estimates. Cost of assault is for aggravated assault.
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